Corporate financing choices shape firm behavior, investment capacity, and economic geography, making capital structure a central concern for maximizing shareholder value. Franco Modigliani of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Merton H. Miller of University of Chicago established that, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and information asymmetry, financing mix is neutral for firm value, which highlights the role of real-world frictions. Tax deductibility of interest creates a benefit to debt, while bankruptcy and agency costs impose limits; trade-off perspectives reconcile these forces and explain why optimal leverage varies across industries and territorial settings. Evidence from analyses by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank links cross-country differences in leverage to legal systems, creditor protection, and tax regimes, underscoring territory-specific relevance for regional investment and employment.
Theoretical foundations
Agency conflicts between managers, shareholders, and creditors influence financing choices and firm governance. Michael C. Jensen of Harvard Business School and William H. Meckling of University of Rochester articulated how agency costs affect capital structure decisions, prompting governance mechanisms that align incentives. Stewart C. Myers of Massachusetts Institute of Technology introduced information asymmetry considerations that produce a pecking order preference for internal funds over debt and equity, shaping observable financing behavior. Empirical studies conducted by central banks and academic institutions corroborate that firms with stable cash flows and tangible assets tend to adopt higher leverage to capture tax shields, while innovative or young firms prefer equity to avoid distress risks and preserve strategic flexibility.
Firm-level practice
Optimization of capital structure proceeds through balancing marginal benefits and marginal costs of debt, continuous monitoring of market conditions, and governance adjustments that mitigate agency problems. Treasury teams and boards coordinate retained earnings, bank relationships, and market financing, taking into account cultural norms that affect owner control preferences and regional capital-market depth. Practical impacts extend to labor markets and local development since leverage influences capacity for expansion, restructuring, and sustainable investment in environmental projects. Policy analyses by international financial institutions highlight that regulatory clarity and credit access materially affect firms’ ability to implement theoretically optimal capital structures, making institutional context a determining factor in the pursuit of shareholder value.
